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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1961
able." Both the Norway and the Henningsen cases are thus consistent
with Section 2-719, although the reasoning of the New Jersey case does
not depend on the fact of injury to the person.
The law of warranty is obviously in flux, resolving conflicts between
the elements it derives from tort and contract. The observable trend
in favor of buyers raises the further problem of the "third-party victim"
-one who sustains damage because of defects in the product of a
total stranger. The implied warranty of merchantability should in
theory extend to him equally with the buyer and his household, since
the law imposes this warranty to protect the public, rather than to
implement a sales contract. Where injury to the public is a foreseeable
consequence of a breach, other implied warranties and warranties based
on sellers' representations seem likewise open to extension.
Finally, the changing state of warranty law calls attention to the
relationship between disclaimers and privity. If, in the same situation,
one seller is allowed to defend with the disclaimer clause and another
with the privity requirement, then the first seller escapes liability
because there is a contract and the second because there is not a con-
tract. This unfairness can be avoided by confining the disclaimer
defense to situations where there is privity of contract."
DANIEL B. RITTER
SECURITY TRANSACTIONS
Mortgage on Shifting Stock of Merchandise-Mortgagors Duty
to Account. Washington businessmen using mortgages on shifting
stocks of merchandise as a security arrangement received encourage-
ment from United States Rubber Co. v. Young,' that more liberal agree-
ments and procedures may be allowed. However, by failing to expressly
overrule certain prior judicial restrictions on the use of this type of
security, the Washington Supreme Court has left some unnecessary
confusion to be resolved in the future.'
The case arose when U.S. Rubber Co., a creditor, sought the appoint-
ment of a receiver for Glen Young's sporting-goods store. The purchase
20 See also UNiroas COmxERciAL CODE § 2-302 (authorizing refusal to enforce un-
conscionable or clauses generally).
31 Jolly v. C. E. Blackwell & Co., 122 Wash. 620, 211 Pac. 748 (1922). Pelletier v.
Brown Bros. Chevrolet & Oldsmobile, Inc., 164 N.Y.S2d 249 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956) ;
Ford Motor Co. v. Switzer, 140 Va. 383, 125 S.E. 209 (1924). But cf. Odom v. Ford
Motor Co., 230 S.C. 320, 95 S.E.2d 601 (1956).
157 Wn2d 686, 359 P.2d 315 (1961).2 For a brief history and development of the Washington position see Kerr, Chattel
Mortgages on Shifting Stocks of Goods in Washington, 11 WAsH. L. R v. 199 (1936).
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money mortgagee, Hunky Shaw, intervened, asking that the mortgage
on the fixtures and the shifting stock of merchandise be foreclosed. The
receiver attacked the mortgage as void because Shaw had failed to
supervise the monthly accounting required by the mortgage terms and
because he had permitted the mortgagor to deduct his personal living
expenses as a necessary expense of the business. The terms of the
mortgage provided that the mortgagor would: 1) Pay a minimum of
$250.00 per month from the business proceeds after deducting neces-
sary business expenses and purchasing new stock; 2) Make an account-
ing on or before the tenth of each month; and 3) Keep the inventory
at a minimum of $10,000.00.1
The trial court found that Shaw had never required a formal account-
ing4 from the mortgagor although he had been generally aware of both
the gross sales figures and the cost of operating the business. Shaw
neither policed the collection of the $250.00 per month to be applied to
the mortgage debt nor ascertained whether the dispositions of the pro-
ceeds had been made for business expenses. The trial court upheld the
mortgage on the fixtures but found it fraudulent in law as to the inven-
tory because of the mortgagee's failure to collect the payments and
supervise the dispositions.
The Washington Supreme Court reversed the trial court in part,
holding the mortgage on the inventory valid. It reiterated the rule5 that
the terms of shifting stock mortgages should provide for the manner of
maintaining and handling the stock, and for an accounting and pay-
ments on the mortgage debt from the proceeds of sale after allowing for
the expenses of maintaining the business.' However, it held that such
8 "The controlling provisions of the mortgage were contained in the following para-
graph: 'It is understood and agreed that until the total indebtedness secured by this
mortgage is fully paid and satisfied, said mortgagor shall pay unto said mortgagee a
minimum amount of $250.00 per month from the proceeds of the sale of said goods,
wares and merchandise remaining after deducting the necessary expenses of operating
the business of the mortgagor and the purchase of new merchandise stock for cash,
sufficient for the needs of said business.... and for the above purpose a true and cor-
rect accounting shall be had between said mortgagor and mortgagee on or before the
10th day of each and every month, . . . of the proceeds of the said business for the
preceeding month. The mortgagor also agrees to . . . keep an inventory of merchan-
dise . . . of at least Ten Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($10,000)'." United States
Rubber Co. v. Young, 57 Wn.2d 686, 687-88, 359 P.2d 315, 316 (1961).
4 Compare Puget Sound Pulp & Timber Co. v. Clear Lake Cedar Corp., 15 Wn.2d
707, 132 P2d 363 (1942), with It re McLean, 270 Fed. 348 (W.D. Wash. 1920) in
regard to what is meant by accounting.
5 Miller v. Scarbrough, 108 Wash. 646, 185 Pac. 625 (1919).
6 Originally stated in Miller v. Scarbrough, 108 Wash. 646, 651, 185 Pac. 625, 626-27
(1919). "The proper rule to be applied to mortgages hereafter executed should be that,
for a chattel mortgage on a shifting stock of goods, which is to remain in the possession
of the mortgagor to be disposed of in the usual course of trade, to be valid the mortgage
(VOL.. 37
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mortgages are valid, unless actual fraud is shown, even though the
mortgagee fails to enforce the accounting as provided in their terms.
The validity of a chattel mortgage which permits the mortgagor to
remain in possession and to apply the proceeds to the mortgage debt
has never been disputed in Washington,' as it has been in some juris-
dictions.' Prior to Miller v. Scarbrough,9 the court only questioned
whether the mortgage relationship was in fact fraudulent. If the mort-
gage was properly recorded, oral evidence proving an agreement be-
tween the parties to apply the proceeds to the mortgage debt would be
entertained."0
In Miller v. Scarbrough," the court abruptly reversed its position
and announced that evidence of oral collateral agreements would no
longer be entertained. Instead, a double burden-as was applied by
the trial court in the Young case-has been placed on those who wish to
do inventory financing. First, the terms of the agreement are required
to be in the mortgage instrument itself. Second, the mortgagee has a
duty to see that the mortgagor complies with the terms of the mortgage
and properly applies the proceeds of sale to the mortgage debt. Nothing
short of fulfilling these requirements has been sufficient to create a valid
mortgage 2 until Young. In the Young case the court appears to have
relaxed the second of these requirements, stressing that the validity of
shifting stock mortgages should depend upon notice and fraudulent
intent; not on strict enforcement of accounting provisions.
Like many other courts, the Washington court at an early time un-
itself should provide the manner of maintaining and handling the stock, with provisions
for an accounting and payments on the mortgage debt from the proceeds of the sale,
after allowing for the expenses of the business and of the keeping up or building up
thereof, to the end that creditors can, by an examination of the record, discover the real
terms and obligations of the mortgage."
7 Wineburgh v. Schaer, 2 Wash. Terr. 328, 5 Pac. 299 (1884). The court held
invalid a mortgage which left the mortgagor in possession but intimated that a mort-
gage in which the proceeds were used to extinguish the debt would be valid. Langert
v. Brown, 3 Wash. Terr. 102, 13 Pac. 704 (1887), expressly held that such a mortgage
was valid. See cases cited in Kerr, supra note 2, 199 n.2.
8 2 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES & PREFERENCES §§ 589, 590 (rev. ed. 1940).
Glenn calls it the New York rule-the arrangement is fraudulent because the mortgagee
in holding the mortgagor out as the ostensible owner, gives the mortgagor false credit
which is a fraud on the creditors.
1 108 Wash. 646, 185 Pac. 625 (1919).
10 Warren v. His Creditors, 3 Wash. 48, 28 Pac. 257 (1891) ; Ephraim v. Kelleher,
4 Wash. 243, 29 Pac. 985 (1892). In this case an oral agreement that the mortgagor
could sell the goods, replace the stock, pay business expenses, and apply the balance to
the debt-terms similar to those in the Young case-was approved.
1 108 Wash. 646, 185 Pac. 625 (1919).
12 E.g., In re McLean, 270 Fed. 348 (W.D. Wash. 1920) ; General Mercantile Co.
v. Waters, 127 Wash. 481, 221 Pac. 299 (1923) ; Spokane Merchants Ass'n v. Mussell-
man, 134 Wash. 116, 234 Pac. 1033 (1925); Tahoma Fin. Co. v. Shannon, 138 Wash.
90, 244 Pac. 271 (1926); Warner v. Hibler, 146 Wash. 651, 264 Pac. 423 (1928).
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questioningly" followed the mistaken trend begun by Twyne's Case4
and extended by Benedict v. Ratner.15 These courts viewed suspiciously,
as a fraud on creditors, any transaction in which the mortgagor retained
all the apparent incidents of ownership by remaining in possession with
power to sell and use the proceeds. Once committed, some courts un-
waveringy continued to follow this position although systems of record-
ing developed and the concepts of financing expanded.
In Miller v. Scarbrough,6 the Washington court indicated that its
purpose in requiring that the terms of the accounting agreement be in-
cluded in the mortgage instrument and that the mortgagee exact com-
pliance with them was to protect the mortgagor's creditors from fraud.Y
It is questionable whether these requirements serve their intended pur-
pose in modern times. While they continue to function as ground rules,
policing rules are now out of date, are a hindrance to financing, 8 and
do not provide protection for creditors. " [T]he rendering of a monthly
account, as between mortgagor and mortgagee, would neither decrease
the mortgage debt nor apprise the general creditors of its status.' 0I
Now that inventory financing is common, general creditors can no
longer assume that inventory is free of lien, especially when an exami-
nation of the public records would reveal many inventory mortgages."0
In fact, creditors nowadays generally neither rely on the public records
nor trust that the mortgage has been policed. On the contrary, creditors
rely either on their own judgment of the debtor's solvency or on credit
ratings.21
Many writers feel that the courts' failure to keep pace with expanded
concepts of inventory financing has placed an undue restriction on
13 Wineburg v. Schaer, 2 Wash. Terr. 328. 5 Pac. 299 (1884). "The cases upon each
side of the question [whether inventory mortgages with mortgagor in possession and
with power to sell is valid] . . .were ably discussed and illustrated by counsel upon
both sides. If we were at liberty to do so, it would be profitable to take up these cases,
and attempt to extract from them the rule upon the subject that seems to be most
consonant with sound reason. We are stopped on the threshold of the investigation,
however, by an authority of such great weight, that it would have great force with
the Court of any State where the question was still an open one; and that, as to this
Court, is binding and authoritative." Id. at 334, 5 Pac. at 300.
143 Co. Rep. 80 b (1601).
Is 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
16108 Wash. 646, 185 Pac. 625 (1919).
17.d. at 651, 185 Pac. at 626.
18 Note, Policing Accounts Receivable and Inventory Under Modern Factor's Legis-
lation, 101 U. PA. L. Rxv. 392, 401 (1952).
11 United States Rubber Co. v. Young, 57 Wn2d 686, 689, 359 P2d 315, 317 (1961).
20 Note, Policing Accounts Receivable and Inventory Under Modern Factor's Legis-
latio, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 392, 401 (1952).
1Cohen & Gerbes, Mortgages of Merchandise, 39 CoLTJm. L. R v. 1338 (1939);
Dunham, Inventory and Accounts Receivable Financing, 62 HARv. L. REv. 588 (1949).
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needed economic growth.22 The problem has been alleviated somewhat
by the use of pledge and trust arrangements, and by legislation."
In approving the conditional sales contract in Washington at an early
time, its usefulness was balanced against the need to protect third
parties."' The conflict was resolved by requiring filing and recording
only.25 Subsequently, with the requirement of policing omitted, legisla-
tive protection was also given to inventory financing's second cousin,
the assignment of accounts receivable."8 Finally, two other forms were
adopted: field warehousing 7 and trust receipts. 8 Unfortunately, these
are limited in use. Field warehousing is best adapted to manufacturing
situations and the Uniform Trust Receipts Act has been construed to
apply primarily to tripartite transactions.2 9
It is anomalous that these methods of financing should receive legis-
lative support while inventory financing should be kept from full-share
participation because of the Washington court's failure to abrogate
archaic judge-made rules. Inventory financing has been penalized by
the Miller rule under which the failure to police the proceeds results in
loss of the entire lien. In contrast, the underlying theme of the correla-
tive legislation is to sustain the lien, if correctly filed, and to allow loss
of the unpoliced collateral only. 0 Thus, the lender does not risk invali-
22Kerr, supra note 2; Cohen & Gerbes, supra note 21; Dunham, supra note 21; Shat-
tuck, Secured Transactions, (Other than Real Estate Mortgages)-A Comparison of
the Law in Washington and the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 9, 29 WASH. L.
REV. 1 (1954); Comment, Uxrros Com,&mcLAL CoDE § 9-205; Note, Policing Ac-
counts Receivable and Inventory Under Modern Factor's Legislation, 101 U. PA. L.
REv. 392 (1952); Kripke, The "Secured Transaction" Provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 35 VA. L. Rv. 577 (1949).23 The states having Factors Lien Acts or adopting the UmnFORM CoMMzacrA.
CODE are current examples. Under UNIFoRm ComsRaciA CODE Section 9-205, specific
accounting provisions are abolished. Washington's Accounts Receivable Act, RCW
63.16, is another example where the legislature has abolished policing requirements.24 "As between the vendor and a third party who has been misled, the law has taken
into consideration not merely the objective incidents such as use and possession, but in
addition the balance of social, particularly business, convenience to vendors and third
parties generally. Sometimes the third party is protected; sometimes the vendor. In
the case of the conditional sale, the vendor was with few exceptions protected at com-
mon law, the rationalizations of estoppel, apparent ownership, and constructive fraud
being urged in vain. With the intention of protecting both the vendor and the third
part, so far as possible. resort was made to recording and filing acts for the purpose of
giving knowledge to third parties." Comment, Conditional Sales-Recent Legislation,
Particularly Where Personalty is Attached to Buildings an Realty, 13 WAsH. L. REv.
46, 47 (1938).
25 RCW 63.12.
20 RCW 63.16.
27 RCW 22.04.
28 RCW 61.20.
20 Skilton, The Factor's Lien on Merchandise, 1955 Wis. L. REV. 356. 361.30 RCW 63.16.080 provides: "Irrespective of acquiescence, consent or permission by
assignee, no act or omission (including the exercise of dominion and control), by the
assignor with respect to an assigned account, the proceeds thereof, or goods sold and
1962]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
dation of his entire lien by choosing not to police his collateral, but loses
only the unpoliced proceeds.3" This adequately protects the creditor by
forcing the lender to police for business reasons, yet does not harmfully
deter the growth of inventory financing.
The latter approach is the position taken in the Uniform Commercial
Code,32 which has been accepted in sixteen states and which appears to
be near adoption in several other states. In attempting to remove the
obstacles to inventory financing, the policing formalities of Twyne's
Case"3 and Benedict v. Ratner 4 have been expressly rejected, leaving
the extent of the accounting to the dictates of business, not legal
necessity. 5
Results similar to those achieved by use of the Uniform Commercial
Code have been reached in the thirty-one states adopting various fac-
tor's acts, which have found increasing popularity since World War
H1."6 The factor's preferred position began in colonial days when Amer-
ican factors lent money to their English manufacturers for goods
shipped to them, and were given a lien by the court, on all goods in their
returned, shall invalidate the right or lien of the assignee upon any balance remaining
owing on any such account or on any other assigned account." RCW 63.12.030 pro-
vides: "No such assignment shall be deemed invalid as against creditors and subse-
quent purchasers, pledgees, mortgagees and encumbrancers of assignor by reason of
failure of any assignee to assume dominion and control over any such contract so
assigned or the proceeds thereof, or to contract against or to prevent the mingling by
assignor of the proceeds thereof or collections therefrom amongst his funds or place-
ment of the same in his bank account!' RCW 61.20.100 provides: "...the entruster
shall be entitled, to the extent to which and as against all classes of persons as to whom
his security interest was valid at the time of disposition by the trustee, as follows: ....
(3) To any other proceeds of the goods, documents or instruments which are identifi-
able, unless the provision for accounting has been waived by the entruster by words or
conduct ......
31 Shattuck, supra note 22; Dunham, supra note 21.
32 "A security interest is not invalid or fraudulent against creditors by reason of
liberty in the debtor to use or dispose of all or part of the collateral.., or to use or
dispose of proceeds, or by reason of the failure of the secured party to require the
debtor to account for proceeds or replace collateral." Comment, UNIFORM CoMMERcIAL
CODE Section 9-205.
333 Co. Rep. 8O b (1601).
34 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
35 "The principal effect of the Benedict rule has been, not to discourage or eliminate
security transactions in inventory and accounts receivable-on the contrary such trans-
actions have vastly increased in volume-but to force financing arrangements in this
field toward a self-liquidating basis. Furthermore several Circuit Court cases drew...
from... [that] opinion.., needless and costly formalities .... The requirements of "po-
licing" is the substance of the Benedict rule. While this section repeals Benedict in
matters of form, the filing requirements... give other creditors the opportunity to
ascertain from public sources whether property of their debtor or prospective debtor is
subject to secured claims .... [Thus] business, and not legal reasons will determine the
extent to which strict accountability, segregation of collections, daily reports and the
like will be employed." Comment, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE Section 9-205.
36 Note, Ohio Chattel Mortgages and the Factors Lien Law In Inventory Financing,
28 U. CINc. L. REV. 99, 101 (1959).
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possession, actual or constructive." The more recent acts classify any-
one who loans money for merchandise as a factor, and by requiring
public notice of the intent to do factoring, provide the requisite "pos-
session" over the merchandise. By not being misclassified as a chattel
mortgage (and, thus, sharing its burdens), factoring arrangements have
enjoyed the same freedom which other forms of financing have en-
joyed.' s
Several states,39 by legislation, have solved the dilemma in which
Washington mortgagees now find themselves. These acts provide that,
upon filing a description of inventory financing, mortgages made within
a prescribed subsequent period are valid. Creditors and subsequent
mortgagees may demand information from the mortgagee concerning
the exact property and the amount of the debt remaining.
Thus, it would seem that de-emphasis of the accounting requirement
and stressing publicity is the better view. Perhaps, in United States
Rubber Co. v. Young"0 conversion to this view has taken place. How-
ever, the position the court intends to take is not clearly stated. Al-
though the Miller requirements had always been construed strictly, the
court said, "It is not necessary that all of the proceeds from sales should
be applied on the debt, or even all of the net proceeds, but the agreed
terms of payment must be set forth."" (Emphasis added.) The court
appears to say in Young that the mortgagor and the mortgagee may
agree to any terms and, except for fraudulent reasons, the mortgage
will remain valid. This would lead to two conclusions: first, the Miller
requirements no longer serve a useful purpose except as ground rules,
and second, the present test is one of actual fraud. "We think this
court has set forth the correct rule.., that such a mortgage is valid as
against general creditors, in the absence of a showing of actual fraud.
A mere failure to demand and enforce strict performance is not fraud
in itself."' 2
Even though Young may indicate a more liberal trend in Washington,
as one writer believes, 3 the attorney will be taking a risk if he changes
his past procedures. It must be remembered that the court cited verba-
37 For the development of factoring and its history see Skilton, The Factor's Lien on
Merchandise, 1955 Wis. L. REv. 356.
38 Id. at 357.
30 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-8 (1953) ; N.Y. LIEN LAW 32 § 230(c) (Supp.
1961) ; NJ. STAT. ANN. 46:28-5.1.
40 57 Wn2d 686, 359 P.2d 315 (1961).
41 Id. at 689, 359 P.2d at 316.
42 United States Rubber Co. v. Young, 57 Wn.2d 686, 690, 359 P.2d 315, 317 (1961).
43 Moore, Developments in Factoring, Inventory Liens and Accounts Receivable
Financing, 16 Bus. LAw. 818, 825-26 (1961).
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tim the Miller rule, and thus reaffirmed its past position. Since one can
not be certain what Young may stand for, the following conclusions
should be drawn:
1. Because the court has not seen fit to explicitly overrule Miller v.
Scarbrough," to file valid mortgages on shifting stocks, the attorney
must continue to follow the Miller requirements and include the requi-
site provisions within the mortgage itself.
2. The entire mortgage will be found invalid if the mortgagee fails in
his duty to see that the mortgagor complies with the mortgage terms,
whereas, in other types of financing, e.g., accounts receivable, mere loss
of collateral results.
3. It is still uncertain whether anything except business expenses
may be taken from the proceeds, although it appears that the court's
concept of what constitutes a business expense has broadened. 5
4. Although the court indicated that the accounting might be some-
thing less than a strict accounting, e.g., a business accounting geared to
each situation, it would be wise, to prevent future litigation on the
question of fraud, to continue the practice of strict accounting as in the
past.
It should be hoped that the future will hold more flexibility for inven-
tory financing. Recording statutes, credit ratings, and other procedures
are available to protect creditors. The court should continue to promote
inventory financing by discarding needless rules which hamper financ-
ing46 and should resolve the confusion caused by the contradictory posi-
tions stated in the Young case. However, until it does, a wait-and-see
attitude will be necessary. JOHN E. IVERSON
Priority-Federal Tax Liens and Future Advance Mortgages. In
American Surety Co. v. Sundberg' the Washington Supreme Court
44 108 Wash. 646, 185 Pac. 625 (1919).
4 5 In Young, for example, the court allowed the deduction of Young's personal living
expenses, which in this situation was necessary to the business because Young, who
devoted his entire time to the business, was unsalaried. U.S. Rubber's argument that,
under Income Tax definitions, personal expenses could not be business expenses did not
persuade the court. The court realized that in a sole proprietorship business-where
salaries are not usually received-it is to the creditor's benefit that the owner be able
to devote all his time to making profits rather than using part of it to earn income to
meet his personal expenses.
46 ,... the result is that one who extends credit to a merchandiser and attempts to
protect himself by a mortgage on a shifting stock of goods as security, iven though he
complies with the recording statutes, becomes an insurer of the mortgagor's perform-
ance of the contract. Such a liability would render the security valueless." United
States Rubber Co. v. Young, 57 Wn.2d 686, 689-90, 359 P.2d 315, 317 (1961).
'158 Wash. Dec. 335, 363 P.2d 99 (1961).
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